CarMax Breach Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (CAREDMMAT1769740948)

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the CarMax breach identified under incident ID CAREDMMAT1769740948.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of CarMax's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/carmax, the number of followers: 165872, the industry type: Retail and the number of employees: 17416 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 789 and after the incident was 723 with a difference of -66 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on CarMax and their customers.

Hinge recently reported "ShinyHunters Expands Vishing Campaign Targeting High-Value Organizations with Advanced Phishing Kits", a noteworthy cybersecurity incident.

Okta researchers uncovered a surge in voice-based social engineering attacks linked to the extortion group ShinyHunters (UNC6040), targeting over 100 high-value organizations.

The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting Single Sign-On (SSO) platforms (Okta, Microsoft, Google), SaaS applications, and exposing Credentials, Session tokens, Sensitive data, Personally identifiable information (PII).

In response, and began remediation that includes Audit OSS provider logs for suspicious device enrollments or new IP logins, and stakeholders are being briefed through Advisories to verify IT support calls through official channels.

The case underscores how Ongoing, teams are taking away lessons such as Voice-based social engineering and real-time phishing kits can bypass advanced MFA protections. Organizations must verify IT support communications through official channels and monitor for suspicious logins, and recommending next steps like Verify IT support calls through official channels, Audit OSS provider logs for suspicious device enrollments or new IP logins and Implement additional authentication layers beyond MFA, with advisories going out to stakeholders covering Companies advised to verify IT support calls and audit logs for suspicious activity.

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Phishing: Vishing (T1566.004) with high confidence (90%), with evidence including voice-based social engineering attacks, and impersonate IT support, guiding victims through fake MFA prompts and Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts (T1078.004) with moderate to high confidence (80%), with evidence including employee account compromise via phishing/vishing, and session token hijacking for SSO platforms like Okta. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Brute Force: Password Guessing (T1110.001) with moderate to high confidence (70%), with evidence including credential theft via phishing kits, and real-time phishing kits to steal credentials, Adversary-in-the-Middle (T1557) with high confidence (90%), with evidence including man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks on login sessions, and live Phishing Panels dynamically adjust phishing pages, Steal Application Access Token (T1528) with moderate to high confidence (80%), with evidence including session token hijacking for SSO platforms like Okta, and steal credentials, session tokens, and Forge Web Credentials: SAML Tokens (T1606.002) with moderate to high confidence (70%), with evidence including bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA), and fake MFA prompts to manipulate authentication flows. Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified User Execution: Malicious Link (T1204.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), with evidence including real-time phishing kits to guide victims, and fake MFA prompts to manipulate authentication flows. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Modify Authentication Process: Multi-Factor Authentication (T1556.006) with high confidence (90%), with evidence including bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA), and defeats even push-based MFA and Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location (T1036.005) with moderate to high confidence (80%), with evidence including phishing pages to match legitimate authentication flows, and impersonate IT support. Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Local System (T1005) with moderate to high confidence (80%), with evidence including sensitive data, personally identifiable information (PII) compromised, and data exfiltration from SaaS applications and Data from Information Repositories: Sharepoint (T1213.002) with moderate to high confidence (70%), with evidence including data exfiltration from SaaS applications, and sSO platforms like Okta targeted. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with moderate to high confidence (80%), with evidence including data exfiltration from SaaS applications, and shinyHunters claimed responsibility for data leaks and Transfer Data to Cloud Account (T1537) with moderate to high confidence (70%), with evidence including data leaks from multiple companies, and potential data sold on dark web. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Data Destruction (T1485) with lower confidence (40%), with evidence including extortion group with history of data leaks, and potential for further data leaks and Data Manipulation: Stored Data Manipulation (T1565.001) with moderate confidence (50%), with evidence including man-in-the-middle attacks on login sessions, and fake MFA prompts to manipulate authentication. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.